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Justice Scalia’s Other Standing Legacy 
Tara Leigh Grove† 
Everyone in the legal community knows about Lujan v 
Defenders of Wildlife.1 Indeed, few decisions in Article III 
standing jurisprudence are as noteworthy (or as notorious) as 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Lujan, which 
restricted Congress’s power to confer standing on private 
individuals.2 The Court held that Article III requires plaintiffs to 
assert a “concrete injury” and accordingly struck down a citizen-
suit provision that permitted “any person” to bring suit to 
enforce federal environmental law.3 
Lujan has provoked significant academic commentary (much 
of it critical).4 But another line of opinions may prove, in the long 
run, to be equally significant. Scalia was also (indeed, perhaps 
more) skeptical of a very different type of litigant: government 
institutions. Suits brought by, and between, federal and state 
governments are a growing breed. Just to offer a few examples: In 
United States v Windsor,5 the federal executive faced off against 
                                                
 † Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School; Visiting Professor, Harvard 
Law School. I am grateful to Curt Bradley, Aaron Bruhl, Neal Devins, Vicki Jackson, Alli 
Larsen, Henry Monaghan, Jonathan Nash, and Jim Pfander for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. I also appreciate the suggestions of participants at a faculty workshop at 
William and Mary Law School. 
 1 504 US 555 (1992). 
 2 See id at 571–78 (holding that private individuals must demonstrate concrete 
injury and that Congress could not through a citizen-suit provision confer standing on 
“any person” to enforce the Endangered Species Act). See also James E. Pfander, Scalia’s 
Legacy: Originalism and Change in the Law of Standing, 6 British J Am Legal Stud 85–
107 (2017) (emphasizing the considerable impact of Scalia’s opinion in Lujan). 
 3 Lujan, 504 US at 571–78. 
 4 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen 
Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich L Rev 163, 235 (1992) (arguing that “Congress 
can create standing as it chooses and, in general, can deny standing when it likes”). See 
also Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 BU L Rev 159, 
174–77 (2011) (discussing aspects of the debate over Lujan). My prior work has defended 
the Court’s decision. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 11 U Pa J Const L 781, 831–33 (2009) (arguing that “Congress may not confer 
standing via citizen-suit provisions that transfer to private parties the Executive 
Branch’s duty to see that federal law is obeyed”) (quotation marks omitted). But that is 
not my focus here. 
 5 133 S Ct 2675 (2013). 
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the House of Representatives over the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act6 (DOMA).7 In Massachusetts v 
Environmental Protection Agency8 and Texas v United States,9 
state governments brought suit to contest the executive branch’s 
failure to enforce federal environmental and immigration law, 
respectively.10 And in United States House of Representatives v 
Burwell,11 one chamber of Congress challenged the federal 
executive’s implementation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act12 (ACA).13 
Scalia objected to this new crop of intergovernmental 
disputes for many of the same reasons he advocated limits on 
private party standing. In both lines of cases, the Justice was 
driven by an overriding concern about restraining federal 
judicial power. Thus, in Lujan, Scalia urged that standing 
requirements “identif[y] those ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that 
are the business of the courts rather than of the political 
branches,” and thereby confine “the Third Branch” to its proper 
sphere.14 He emphasized the same point in government standing 
cases: “‘[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic 
idea—the idea of separation of powers.’ It keeps us minding our 
own business.”15 
                                                
 6 Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996), codified at 1 USC § 7. 
 7 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2683–84. After the executive branch declined to defend 
DOMA, the House of Representatives intervened to defend the law. Id. The Supreme 
Court held that the executive had standing to appeal a lower-court decision invalidating 
DOMA (despite its refusal to defend the law) and did not comment on the House’s 
standing. See id at 2686, 2888. But Scalia and Justice Samuel Alito separately debated 
the House’s standing. See id at 2698 (Scalia dissenting); id at 2711 (Alito dissenting). I 
discuss Windsor in more detail in Part II.A. 
 8 549 US 497 (2007). 
 9 787 F3d 733 (5th Cir 2015), affd by equally divided court, 136 S Ct 2271 (2016). 
 10 See Massachusetts, 549 US at 505–06 (upholding state standing in a suit 
challenging the EPA’s failure to regulate motor vehicle emissions); Texas, 787 F3d at 
748–54 (upholding state standing to challenge the federal executive’s Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program). 
 11 130 F Supp 3d 53 (DDC 2015). 
 12 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 13 See Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d at 57–58 (upholding the House’s standing to 
challenge the executive branch’s alleged misuse of appropriated funds, but denying 
standing to challenge the executive’s delays in implementing the ACA). 
 14 Lujan, 504 US at 576. See also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an 
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U L Rev 881, 881 (1983) 
(“[T]he judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and inseparable element of [the 
separation of powers], whose disregard will inevitably produce . . . an overjudicialization 
of the processes of self-governance.”). 
 15 Arizona State Legislature v Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 
S Ct 2652, 2695 (2015) (Scalia dissenting) (citation omitted), quoting Allen v Wright, 468 
US 737, 750 (1984). See also Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2694 (Scalia 
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This emphasis on judicial overreach drove much of Scalia’s 
jurisprudential philosophy. He was perplexed by what he saw as 
the modern Supreme Court’s “Never Say Never Jurisprudence,” 
that is, the Court’s apparent unwillingness to “admit[ ] that 
some matters—any matters—are none of its business.”16 But in 
his effort to rein in the federal judiciary, Scalia may have 
overlooked a deeper problem. In upholding government standing 
claims, the federal judiciary has not imposed itself on unwilling 
participants. On the contrary, in recent decades, federal and 
state government institutions have invited (indeed, urged) the 
federal courts to resolve their disputes, rather than settling 
their issues through the political process. 
But therein lies a potentially greater threat to the 
constitutional separation of powers. Building on prior work,17 
this Essay suggests that the rise in “government versus 
government” lawsuits is a symptom of two related (and, to my 
mind, troubling) developments in our constitutional separation 
of powers. First, there has been an ever-increasing reliance on 
the judiciary to settle controversial issues. Second, there has 
been a corresponding decline of faith in the political process. To 
the extent these trends continue—and courts become embroiled 
in more and more political disputes—that may not bode well for 
the long-term independence of “the Third Branch.” Standing 
restrictions, after all, are designed not only to constrain the 
federal courts but also to protect them. 
                                                                                                             
dissenting) (“Disputes between governmental branches or departments regarding the 
allocation of political power do not in my view constitute ‘cases’ or ‘controversies’ 
committed to our resolution by Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution.”). 
 16 Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia concurring) (making this 
comment in a case allowing the federal judiciary to hold that some customary 
international-law claims are actionable under the Alien Tort Statute). 
 17 My earlier articles advocated limits on government standing. The arguments rest 
primarily on constitutional text, structure, history, and doctrine. But those articles also 
suggest that there are important prudential reasons to be wary of government standing. 
This Essay expands on that line of thinking. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing outside of 
Article III, 162 U Pa L Rev 1311, 1314–16 (2014) (arguing that Article II and Article I 
help define the scope and limits of executive and legislative standing to represent the 
United States); Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 Cornell 
L Rev 851, 857 (2016) (arguing that states have broad standing to protect state law, 
including in suits against the federal government, but no “special” power—that is, no 
greater power than private parties—to challenge the federal executive’s implementation 
of federal law); Tara Leigh Grove and Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to 
Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L Rev 571, 627–28 (2014) (arguing that structural 
principles, particularly bicameralism and the separation of law enactment from law 
implementation, “help explain why the House and the Senate have standing to enforce 
committee subpoenas but lack standing to defend federal laws”). 
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I.  SCALIA ON THE “NEW” GOVERNMENT STANDING 
This Essay focuses on the rise in intergovernmental disputes 
and the accompanying effort to expand government standing. To be 
sure, government litigants often do have standing to bring suit in 
federal court. For example, governments can suffer concrete 
injuries in fact just like private parties—if, for example, someone 
breaches a contract with the government or trespasses on 
government-owned land.18 Moreover, governments are in some 
respects “special” litigants, who can invoke federal jurisdiction 
even when private parties cannot. The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that a government (at least when represented by its 
executive branch)19 may enforce or defend its laws, absent any 
showing of concrete injury.20 That is, in sharp contrast to a 
private party, a government official often has standing simply to 
“see[ ] that the law is obeyed.”21 
Recent cases, however, have pushed on these traditional 
boundaries of government standing. In Windsor, for example, 
the executive claimed standing not only when it defended but 
also when it refused to defend a federal statute.22 In Burwell, a 
                                                
 18 See generally, for example, United States v Estate of Hage, 810 F3d 712 (9th Cir 
2016) (holding that the plaintiff was liable to the United States for trespassing on federal 
lands). 
 19 The Supreme Court has also suggested that a state legislature may have 
standing to defend state law on behalf of a state, although private parties lack such 
standing. See Arizonans for Official English v Arizona, 520 US 43, 65 (1997) (“[S]tate 
legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if 
state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s interests.”), citing Karcher v 
May, 484 US 72, 82 (1987). There is considerable debate as to whether a chamber of 
Congress may represent the United States in court. I have argued that is not 
permissible. See Grove, 162 U Pa L Rev at 1353–65 (cited in note 17). 
 20 See United States v Raines, 362 US 17, 27 (1960) (holding that the federal 
executive branch has standing to enforce civil rights laws, at least when authorized 
by Congress); In re Debs, 158 US 564, 583–84, 599–600 (1895) (upholding executive 
standing to prevent interference with the transport of US mail); Maine v Taylor, 477 US 
131, 137 (1986) (upholding state standing to defend state law on the ground that “a State 
clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”). See 
also Alfred L. Snapp & Son v Puerto Rico, 458 US 592, 601 (1982) (recognizing state 
standing to protect such sovereign interests). 
 21 Federal Election Commission v Akins, 524 US 11, 24 (1998) (holding that private 
plaintiffs lack standing to assert “abstract” “generalized grievance[s]” like “the interest 
in seeing that the law is obeyed”). See also Lujan, 504 US at 573–74: 
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available 
grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s 
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief 
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at 
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy. 
 22 See Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2684–89. 
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chamber of Congress asserted that it was “injured”—and could 
sue the federal executive—when the executive (allegedly) 
misapplied federal law.23 And in Massachusetts and Texas, state 
governments claimed “special” standing not simply to enforce 
and defend their own state laws but also to challenge the federal 
executive’s handling of federal law.24 This new crop of 
intergovernmental litigation is my focus in this Essay and, as 
described below, was of deep concern to Justice Scalia. 
Scalia first expressed his discomfort with government 
standing as a judge on the DC Circuit. The court of appeals at 
that time permitted legislators to assert certain “institutional 
injuries”—that is, claims of harm to their official powers or 
duties. For example, the court found that a group of senators 
“suffered injury in fact” when President Jimmy Carter 
terminated a treaty without Senate consent.25 In a 1984 
concurrence in Moore v United States House of Representatives,26 
then-Judge Scalia declared: “Such a dispute has no place in the 
law courts.”27 “[N]o officers of the United States, of whatever 
                                                
 23 See Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d at 57–58. 
 24 See Massachusetts, 549 US at 505–06, 518 (upholding state standing in a suit 
challenging the EPA’s failure to regulate motor vehicle emissions); Texas, 787 F3d at 743, 
748–54 (upholding state standing to challenge the federal executive’s Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program). 
 25 See Goldwater v Carter, 617 F2d 697, 701–03 (DC Cir 1979) (“By excluding the 
Senate from the treaty termination process, the President has deprived each individual 
Senator of his alleged right to cast a vote that will have binding effect on whether the 
Treaty can be terminated.”). See also Kennedy v Sampson, 511 F2d 430, 433–36 (DC Cir 
1974) (holding that an individual senator had standing to challenge the president’s 
pocket veto of a bill that the senator supported). Notably, a plurality of the Supreme 
Court later dismissed the suit in Goldwater as presenting a nonjusticiable political 
question and did not reach the standing issue. See Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996, 
1002–06 (1979) (Rehnquist concurring in the judgment). 
 26 733 F2d 946 (DC Cir 1984). In Moore, eighteen members of the House of 
Representatives brought suit to challenge the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
of 1982 as a violation of the Origination Clause. See id at 948. The panel majority found 
that the plaintiffs had standing but dismissed their suit under the equitable discretion 
doctrine that the court of appeals at the time applied to legislative standing. See id. See 
also id at 951–52 (“The appellants allege a specific injury in fact to a cognizable legal 
interest: the deprivation of an opportunity to debate and vote on the origination of [the 
statute] in the House.”). 
 27 Moore, 733 F2d at 957 (Scalia concurring in result). See also id at 959 (Scalia 
concurring in result), quoting Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803): 
[W]e sit here neither to supervise the internal workings of the executive and 
legislative branches nor to umpire disputes between those branches regarding 
their respective powers. Unless and until those [disputes] . . . harm[ ] private 
rights, it is no part of our constitutional province, which is “solely, to decide on 
the rights of individuals.” 
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Branch, . . . have a judicially cognizable private interest” in 
“their governmental powers.”28 
Scalia maintained this antagonism toward government 
standing throughout his career on the Supreme Court. He joined 
the Court’s opinion in Raines v Byrd,29 which held that a group 
of legislators lacked standing to challenge the Line Item Veto 
Act30 and (much like Scalia’s opinion in Moore) strongly 
questioned whether government officials could ever allege an 
“injury to official authority or power.”31 Likewise, Scalia 
endorsed Chief Justice John Roberts’s dissenting opinion in 
Massachusetts, which insisted that the state lacked standing to 
object to the federal agency’s implementation of federal 
environmental law.32 But Scalia’s most emphatic declarations on 
government standing came in 2013 and 2015, when he dissented 
from the Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in Windsor 
and Arizona State Legislature v Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission.33 
Windsor involved a challenge to DOMA, which prohibited 
the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages for 
purposes of federal law.34 The case raised questions of both 
executive and legislative standing. The Court held that the 
executive had standing to appeal a lower-court decision 
invalidating DOMA,35 even though the executive declined to 
defend the law, and in fact insisted that the statute “violate[d] 
                                                
 28 Moore, 733 F2d at 959 (Scalia concurring).  
 29 521 US 811 (1997). 
 30 Pub L No 104-130, 110 Stat 1200 (1996). 
 31 Raines, 521 US at 814, 817, 821, 826, 829–30. See also id at 821 (emphasizing 
that “appellees’ claim of standing is based on a loss of political power, not loss of any 
private right, which would make the injury more concrete”). The Court emphasized that 
historical practice cut strongly against such a claim. See id at 826–28 (asserting that in 
past “confrontations between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch,” 
involving the president’s removal power, the pocket veto, and the legislative veto, “no 
suit was brought on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or power”; instead, 
the issues were brought to the judiciary by “plaintiff[s] with traditional Article III 
standing”). The Court did “attach some importance” to the fact that the legislators’ 
challenge was not approved by their respective chambers; instead, the House and Senate 
counsel opposed the suit. Id at 829–30. But the Court did not opine on whether the 
institutions would have had standing. 
 32 Massachusetts, 549 US at 549 (Scalia dissenting) (stating that he joined 
Roberts’s dissenting opinion “in full, and would hold that this Court has no jurisdiction 
to decide this case because petitioners lack standing”). 
 33 135 S Ct 2652 (2015). 
 34 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2682. 
 35 Id at 2686 (“[T]he United States retains a stake sufficient to support Article III 
jurisdiction on appeal.”). 
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the fundamental constitutional guarantee of equal protection.”36 
The Windsor majority did not rule on the standing of the House 
of Representatives, which intervened in the litigation to defend 
the law in place of the executive.37 But Justice Samuel Alito 
separately argued that the House had standing to appeal.38 He 
reasoned that the House of Representatives had suffered an 
“injury in fact” because the lower-court decision striking down 
DOMA “limited Congress’ power to legislate.”39 
Scalia disagreed on both counts. He argued that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction over the executive’s appeal because there was 
no adversity between the executive and the private plaintiff 
Edith Windsor; both sought the invalidation of DOMA.40 
(Although Scalia focused on the lack of adverseness, I have 
elsewhere argued that the primary jurisdictional obstacle was 
standing: the executive branch lacks standing to appeal when it 
refuses to defend a federal law.)41 But Scalia was equally 
dismissive of the idea that the House of Representatives might 
have standing to defend DOMA in the executive’s stead. He 
scoffed at Alito’s assertion that the lower-court decision had 
“impair[ed] Congress’ legislative power” by striking down the 
federal law.42 Scalia insisted that “the impairment of a branch’s 
                                                
 36 Brief for the United States on the Merits Question, United States v Windsor, 
Docket No 12-307, *12 (US filed Feb 22, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 
683048). 
 37 See Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2688. 
 38 Id at 2714 (Alito dissenting) (“[I]n the narrow category of cases in which a court 
strikes down an Act of Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act, Congress 
both has standing to defend the undefended statute and is a proper party to do so.”). 
 39 See id at 2712–13 (Alito dissenting). 
 40 Id at 2700–01 (Scalia dissenting) (“Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or 
appellant) who has standing to complain but an opposing party [to create a] 
controversy.”). 
 41 See Grove, 162 U Pa L Rev at 1335–45 (cited in note 17). There are reasons to 
doubt Scalia’s assertion that “adverseness” is an Article III requirement. See id at 1336–
38 (urging that such a requirement would enable a defendant to defeat a plaintiff’s case 
simply by not mounting any defense, and thereby bar default judgments); James E. 
Pfander and Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, 
and Non-contentious Jurisdiction, 124 Yale L J 1346, 1416–40 (2015) (arguing, based on 
historical evidence, that Article III does not require “adverse parties” in all cases). But 
see Martin H. Redish and Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-
or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U Chi L Rev 
545, 546–48, 563–88 (2006) (contending that Article III requires at least some 
adverseness between the parties). 
 42 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2703–05 (Scalia dissenting). See also id at 2712–13 (Alito 
dissenting). 
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powers alone . . . does not, and never has” sufficed for standing 
purposes.43 
In Arizona State Legislature, the Supreme Court held that 
the state legislature had standing to protect its institutional 
interest in regulating the electoral process.44 The majority found 
that the Elections Clause, which allows a state legislature to 
regulate the “times, places and manner”45  of federal elections, 
(arguably) gave that body an institutional interest in controlling 
the process; thus, the Arizona legislature was “injured” when its 
state constitution transferred that power to an independent 
commission.46 Once again, Scalia was incensed. Much as he had 
in Moore and Windsor, the Justice insisted: “Disputes between 
governmental branches or departments regarding the allocation 
of political power do not . . . constitute ‘cases’ or ‘controversies’ 
committed to our resolution by Art. III.”47 
Throughout these opinions, Scalia was driven by a concern 
about judicial overreach. He complained that the majority in 
Windsor found jurisdiction because it was “eager—hungry—to 
tell everyone its view of the legal question at the heart of this 
case.”48 The majority “envision[ed] a Supreme Court standing (or 
rather enthroned) at the apex of government, empowered to 
decide all constitutional questions, always and everywhere 
‘primary’ in its role.”49 Likewise, authorizing legislative 
standing—as Alito sought to do—would “similarly elevate[ ] the 
                                                
 43 Id at 2703–04 (Scalia dissenting) (insisting that the reasoning of Raines 
foreclosed legislative standing: “The opinion spends three pages discussing famous, 
decades-long disputes between the President and Congress . . . that would surely have 
been promptly resolved by a Congress-vs.-the-President lawsuit if the impairment of a 
branch’s powers alone conferred standing to commence litigation. But it does not, and 
never has”). 
 44 Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2658–59 (holding that “the Arizona 
Legislature, having lost authority to draw congressional districts, has standing to 
contest the constitutionality of Proposition 106”). 
 45 US Const Art I, § 4, cl 1. 
 46 See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2663 (“Proposition 106, which gives 
the [independent commission] binding authority over redistricting . . . strips the 
Legislature of its alleged prerogative to initiate redistricting.”). See also US Const Art I, 
§ 4, cl 1. 
 47 Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2694 (Scalia dissenting). See also id at 
2695 (Scalia dissenting) (“What history and judicial tradition show is that courts do not 
resolve direct disputes between two political branches of the same government regarding 
their respective powers.”). 
 48 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2698 (Scalia dissenting). 
 49 Id (Scalia dissenting). See also id (Scalia dissenting) (arguing that “[t]his image 
of the Court would have been unrecognizable to those who wrote and ratified our 
national charter,” who wrote limitations into Article III in order to “guard their right to 
self-rule against [such a] black-robed supremacy”). 
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Court to the ‘primary’ determiner of constitutional questions 
involving the separation of powers.”50 If Congress or the 
executive could “pop immediately into court, in [its] institutional 
capacity,” to complain about the other branch’s interference with 
its powers, “[t]he opportunities for dragging the courts into 
disputes hitherto left for political resolution [would be] 
endless.”51 In Arizona State Legislature, Scalia insisted that 
standing doctrine was designed to prevent such an expansion of 
the federal judicial power: 
That doctrine of standing, that jurisdictional limitation 
upon our powers, does not have as its purpose (as the 
majority assumes) merely to assure that we will decide 
disputes in concrete factual contexts that enable “realistic 
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.” To the 
contrary. “[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single 
basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.” It keeps us 
minding our own business.52 
II.  RAISING CONCERNS ABOUT GOVERNMENT STANDING 
Justice Scalia opposed the expansion of government 
standing for many of the same reasons that he advocated limits 
on private-party standing. To Scalia, standing was a way to 
constrain the federal courts and prevent them from usurping the 
authority of the political branches. This Essay argues that 
Scalia was right to be skeptical of government standing, but for 
deeper reasons than those he articulated. These cases are not 
simply stories of judicial overreach. In fact, government actors 
at both the federal and the state levels are often quite eager to 
refer controversies to the federal judiciary. This Part considers 
first why political actors might turn to the courts. The next parts 
then suggest that such reliance on the federal courts reflects 
                                                
 50 Id at 2703 (Scalia dissenting): 
Though less far reaching in its consequences than the majority’s conversion of 
constitutionally required adverseness into a discretionary element of standing, 
the theory of that dissent similarly elevates the Court to the “primary” 
determiner of constitutional questions involving the separation of powers, and, to 
boot, increases the power of the most dangerous branch: the “legislative 
department.” 
 51 Id at 2703–04 (Scalia dissenting) (“Justice Alito’s notion of standing will [ ] 
enormously shrink the area to which ‘judicial censure, exercised by the courts on 
legislation, cannot extend.’”). 
 52 Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2695 (Scalia dissenting), quoting Allen v 
Wright, 468 US 737, 752 (1984). 
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some worrisome developments in our separation-of-powers 
scheme—and may have troubling long-term implications for the 
federal judiciary. 
A. Why Political Actors Rely on the Courts 
It might at first seem odd that elected officials would turn to 
the federal judiciary to resolve intergovernmental disputes. 
After all, submitting such issues to the courts would seem to 
reduce the power of the government institutions themselves. Yet 
there are several reasons why political actors may be inclined to 
invoke federal jurisdiction. 
First, government officials may seek to advance a political 
agenda through the federal judiciary.53 The president is 
especially well positioned to use the courts for this purpose. He 
not only plays a central role in selecting federal judges54 but also 
“[t]hrough control over the Justice Department . . . can exercise 
significant influence over . . . what arguments are presented” to 
the courts.55 Moreover, when the president faces a hostile or 
divided Congress, he may find that the judiciary is more 
receptive to his views.56 Windsor illustrates this point. President 
Barack Obama declared his opposition to DOMA during the 
2008 presidential campaign and, once in office, urged Congress 
to repeal the law.57 But Congress took little action in response to 
                                                
 53 See, for example, Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to 
Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 Am Polit 
Sci Rev 511, 512–13, 516–17 (2002) (discussing the efforts of the Republican Party in 
the nineteenth century to use the judiciary to advance a pro-business agenda); Ran 
Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: 
Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 L & Soc Inquiry 91, 116 (2000) 
(arguing that political leaders will empower the judiciary if they believe “the judiciary 
in general and the supreme court in particular are likely to produce decisions that . . . 
reflect their ideological preferences”). 
 54 See US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2; Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower 
Court Selection from Roosevelt through Reagan 6 (Yale 1997) (“[T]he placement of the 
power of judicial selection with the powers of the president [in Article II] rather than 
those of Congress suggests that the executive branch is a principal player in the 
appointment process.”). 
 55 See Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The 
Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in US History 196 (Princeton 
2007). 
 56 See Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political 
Fragmentation, and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 Or L Rev 95, 102 (2009) 
(arguing that the judiciary can be “a vital presidential ally against a recalcitrant 
Congress”). 
 57 See Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the 
Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage 126, 142 (Oxford 2013). 
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these requests. The Obama administration had far more success 
when it took the matter to the Supreme Court, which held that 
DOMA “violate[d] basic due process and equal protection 
principles.”58 
Second, even when government officials do not expect to win 
in the courts, federal litigation can be a way to curry favor with 
like-minded voters. This rationale helps explain the rise in 
lawsuits brought by Congress against the executive branch. 
Legislators often engage in “position taking”—that is, publicly 
declaring a stance on a salient issue, without actually 
attempting to change policy.59 Lawmakers may take positions 
by, for example, making speeches, casting votes, or introducing 
legislation that has little chance of being enacted.60 Lawsuits can 
serve this purpose as well. When the Republican-controlled 
House of Representatives intervened to defend DOMA and 
(later) sued the Obama administration over its enforcement of 
the ACA,61 legislators could rest assured that these lawsuits 
would score political points with supporters, even if the 
institution ultimately lost on the merits. 
Third, federal litigation can be a convenient way to avoid 
political responsibility for controversial decisions.62 If the 
Supreme Court resolves the issue, then elected officials no 
longer need to do so. Windsor, for example, not only spared the 
Obama administration from seeking repeal in Congress. The 
decision also took political pressure off congressional 
Republicans, who may not have favored repeal, but who also did 
not want to expend political capital defending an increasingly 
unpopular statute.63 Accordingly, many lawmakers likely 
                                                
 58 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2686, 2693, 2695–96. 
 59 See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 62 (Yale 2d ed 2004) 
(“The congressman as position taker is a speaker rather than a doer. The electoral 
requirement is not that he make pleasing things happen but that he make pleasing 
judgmental statements.”). 
 60 See id at 62–63 & nn 103, 105 (“The ways in which positions can be registered 
are numerous and often imaginative.”). 
 61 See Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d at 57–58. 
 62 See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the 
Judiciary, 7 Stud Am Polit Dev 35, 36 (1993) (asserting that “prominent elected 
officials consciously invite the judiciary to resolve” contentious issues); Keith E. 
Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of 
Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 Am Polit Sci Rev 583, 584 
(2005) (“The establishment and maintenance of judicial review is a way of delegating 
some kinds of political decisions to a relatively politically insulated institution.”). 
 63 See Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar at 126, 161 (cited in note 57) (noting 
that by March 2011, polls showed that Americans opposed DOMA 51 percent to 34 
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welcomed the Supreme Court’s intervention, whether or not they 
agreed with the result. 
Much like their federal counterparts, state officials can 
also use litigation to advance their policy goals. In Arizona 
State Legislature, state lawmakers who had lost in the political 
process sought a different result from the courts.64 More 
prominently, state attorneys general often file suit to advance a 
political agenda—or, at a minimum, to promote a given attorney 
general’s political career. Over the past few decades, the position 
of state attorney general has become a stepping stone to higher 
office.65 (Indeed, one political scientist has suggested that “AG” 
is often short for “aspiring governor.”)66 Accordingly, these 
officials have strong incentives to bring lawsuits that curry favor 
with state voters.67 That is undoubtedly why the Massachusetts 
attorney general pushed for enforcement of federal 
environmental law in Massachusetts,68 while the Texas Attorney 
General in Texas challenged the Obama administration’s 
immigration program.69 Conversely, Texas opposed the 
                                                                                                             
percent and increasingly supported same-sex marriage and asserting that because of this 
changing political landscape, “the overall Republican response to the administration’s 
[nondefense of] . . . DOMA was far more muted than it likely would have been just a 
couple of years earlier”). 
 64 They were, however, unsuccessful. See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 
2658–59 (concluding that there was no violation of the Elections Clause). 
 65 See Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys 
General as National Policymakers, 56 Rev Polit 525, 538 (1994) (observing that, 
beginning in the 1980s, the position of state attorney general became “increasingly 
attractive to a younger, better educated, and more ambitious caliber of attorney”). 
 66 Colin Provost, When Is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy 
Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 Publius 597, 597 (2010). 
 67 Existing research suggests that is precisely what state attorneys general do. See 
Colin Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General 
Participation in Multi-state Lawsuits, 59 Polit Rsrch Q 609, 616 (2006) (concluding, 
based on an empirical study of consumer litigation, that the litigation choices of state 
attorneys general were heavily influenced by citizen ideology and in-state interest 
groups). See also Neal Devins and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty 
Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 Yale L J 2100, 2145 
(2015) (asserting that “ambitious attorneys general have proven adept at expanding 
their base by launching high-visibility legal challenges”). 
 68 See Massachusetts, 549 US at 505–06. 
 69 See Texas, 787 F3d at 743. The case involved the Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program. Id at 743–45. Under the program, 
the executive would decline to remove undocumented immigrants with close ties to the 
United States because their children were US citizens or lawful permanent residents. Id. 
After the passing of Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ 
decision (upholding an injunction against the program) by an equally divided vote. See 
generally United States v Texas, 136 S Ct 2271 (2016). 
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Massachusetts suit,70 while Massachusetts filed a brief in the 
Texas case, insisting that Obama’s program was “lawful, will 
substantially benefit States, and will further the public 
interest.”71 Such “position taking” can score points with like-
minded voters, regardless of the outcome on the merits. 
There are good reasons to assume that government-initiated 
litigation will only increase in the coming years. Over the past 
few decades, there has been a significant growth in party 
polarization.72 As the two major political parties have become 
more “internally cohesive” (with Democrats growing more 
progressive, and Republicans turning more conservative), they 
have also grown “more ideologically polarized from each other.”73 
In this environment, political compromise is challenging. 
Accordingly, government officials may be increasingly tempted 
to advance their policy goals through the courts.74 
Elected officials will also likely be emboldened by the 
judiciary’s recent receptiveness to government standing claims. 
The federal courts have endorsed standing arguments that 
might have been unthinkable fifteen years ago. A Supreme 
Court majority, for example, suggested in Massachusetts that 
state governments are “entitled to special solicitude in our 
standing analysis.”75 In Arizona State Legislature, the Court held 
that a state legislature has a judicially cognizable “institutional” 
interest in regulating federal elections.76 And in Burwell, a 
                                                
 70 See Massachusetts, 549 US at 505 & n 5 (noting that ten states, including Texas, 
supported the EPA’s position). 
 71 Amicus Brief of the States of Washington, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawai’i, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and the District of Columbia in Support of Petitioners, 
Texas v United States, Docket No 15-674, *1 (US filed Mar 8, 2016) (available on 
Westlaw at 2016 WL 922867). 
 72 See Mark D. Brewer, The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan 
Conflict within the American Electorate, 58 Polit Rsrch Q 219, 219–20 (2005) (“By the 
end of the 1980s, partisanship in Congress had risen dramatically and has remained at 
a high level ever since.”); Gary C. Jacobson, A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton 
Legacy and the Congressional Elections of 2000, 116 Polit Sci Q 5, 6 (2001) (arguing that, 
in the 1990s, “the stark partisan polarization among the parties’ politicians . . . 
accelerated”). 
 73 Brewer, 58 Polit Rsrch Q at 219–20 (cited in note 72). 
 74 At a minimum, elected officials may increasingly use litigation as a means of 
“position taking.” See Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee 
Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 Nw U L Rev 737, 765 (2011) (“Position 
taking is especially common in today’s politically polarized Congress.”). 
 75 Massachusetts, 549 US at 519–21. 
 76 See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2663–64 (“The Arizona Legislature . . . 
is an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury.”). 
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federal district court concluded that the House suffered an 
injury in fact when the federal executive allegedly misspent 
federal funds.77 The trend is unmistakable: despite Scalia’s 
admonitions, many federal courts now treat “[d]isputes between 
governmental branches or departments regarding the allocation 
of political power” as “cases” and “controversies” under 
Article III.78 
B. Intergovernmental Litigation as Symptom 
This account suggests that in accepting jurisdiction in cases 
like Windsor, Massachusetts, and Arizona State Legislature, the 
Supreme Court has not imposed itself on unwilling elected 
officials. Instead, these officials have invited the judiciary to 
resolve intergovernmental disputes. Accordingly, Scalia seems to 
have misdiagnosed the source of the problem. But he still had 
good reason to raise concerns about government standing. 
Government-initiated lawsuits seem to be a symptom of two 
related (and troubling) developments in the constitutional 
separation of powers. There is an increasing tendency to rely on 
the courts to resolve controversial issues and a corresponding 
decline in faith in the democratic process. 
Most government officials (and members of the public) today 
view the federal judiciary—and particularly the Supreme 
Court—as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional and other legal 
questions.79 This reliance on the judiciary began over a century 
                                                
 77 See Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d at 57–58: 
The House sues, as an institutional plaintiff, to preserve its power of the purse 
and to maintain constitutional equilibrium between the Executive and the 
Legislature. If its non-appropriation claims have merit . . . the House has been 
injured in a concrete and particular way that is traceable to the [executive] and 
remediable in court. 
The court, however, found that the House could not sue simply over the executive’s 
implementation of federal law. See id (“[T]he House’s claims that [the executive] 
improperly amended the Affordable Care Act concern only the implementation of a 
statute, not adherence to any specific constitutional requirement. The House does not 
have standing to pursue those claims.”). 
 78 Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2694–95 (Scalia dissenting). 
 79 This Essay does not seek to defend or endorse judicial supremacy as a normative 
matter. The point is only that, as a descriptive matter, our society seems to defer to the 
Supreme Court on constitutional questions. See Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: 
How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the 
Constitution 14 (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2009) (arguing that “the American people 
have decided to cede [this power] to the Justices”); Whittington, Political Foundations at 
5 (cited in note 55) (“Through much of American history, presidents have found it in 
their interest to defer to the Court. . . . The strategic calculations of political leaders lay 
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ago and solidified in the mid-to-late twentieth century.80 By the 
1970s, many federal lawmakers assumed that “legal and 
constitutional questions . . . can ultimately be answered only by 
the Supreme Court.”81 
To be sure, many members of the Court have endorsed this 
vision of their role (including, at times, Scalia himself).82 But 
contrary to Scalia’s suggestion in Windsor, it is not simply a 
Court majority that envisions itself as the primary expositor of 
the Constitution.83 That vision of the Court’s role seems to 
dominate our constitutional culture. As a result, government 
institutions may seek a judicial resolution of legal (especially 
constitutional) issues not simply because it is politically 
expedient to do so but because it does not occur to them that the 
issues can be resolved in any other way. 
This development helps explain both why elected officials 
invite the judiciary to adjudicate intergovernmental disputes 
and why the judiciary accepts those invitations. Both the 
political branches and the Third Branch believe the judiciary is 
in charge of answering legal questions. But there is a second 
development that may also explain why the federal judiciary 
recently has been inclined to accept government standing 
claims: a loss of faith in the political process. 
                                                                                                             
the political foundations for judicial supremacy.”); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme 
Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 S Ct Rev 103, 147 (“[T]he modern Congress 
typically treats the Court as the exclusive authority over constitutional issues.”).   
 80 See Barry Friedman and Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal 
Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, 111 Colum L Rev 1137, 1172–82 (2011) (describing 
how the Court’s role as “supreme” vis-à-vis the political branches began to take hold in 
the mid-twentieth century); Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural 
Safeguard, 113 Colum L Rev 929, 948–78 (2013) (describing how, beginning in the late 
nineteenth century, lawmakers increasingly viewed the Court as the ultimate arbiter of 
constitutional and other legal questions). 
 81 Judicial Tenure Act, S Rep No 95-1035, 95 Cong, 2d Sess 9 (1978) (“Since the 
legal and constitutional questions raised by [the bill], as amended, can ultimately be 
answered only by the Supreme Court of the United States, it would unduly extend the 
Committee of the Judiciary’s report to set forth all supporting and opposing views and 
all historical precedents.”). 
 82 See United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 616 n 7 (2000) (“No doubt the political 
branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury 
this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”); Cooper v 
Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958) (arguing that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution”). Scalia joined the Court’s opinion in Morrison, 
as well as other decisions limiting Congress’s power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enforce constitutional guarantees. See, for example, City of Boerne v 
Flores, 521 US 507, 524 (1997) (emphasizing that “this Court has had primary authority 
to interpret” the Bill of Rights). 
 83 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2697–98 (Scalia dissenting). 
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The decline in confidence in political institutions, 
particularly Congress, began in the mid-to-late twentieth 
century, and voter cynicism has only grown more acute in recent 
years.84 Indeed, polls in early 2017 suggested that voter 
confidence in Congress and the presidency was at an all-time 
low.85 Recent political science research suggests that this loss of 
confidence is partly due to the increasing polarization in 
Congress.86 Although many voters may appreciate the partisan 
maneuvering of their own representative, they are frustrated by 
Congress’s apparent inability to get anything done.87 
There is no reason to assume that the federal judiciary is 
unaffected by this loss of faith in political institutions. Judges, 
after all, are voters, too. Accordingly, federal judges may view it 
as their civic duty to settle disputes that political officials have 
(seemingly) proven incapable of resolving themselves. 
Notably, Scalia rejected this cynical vision of the political 
process. That may help explain why he was also comfortable 
rejecting broad claims of government standing. As the Justice 
stated in Windsor: 
To be sure, if Congress cannot invoke our authority in the 
way that Justice Alito proposes, then its only recourse is to 
confront the President directly. Unimaginable evil this is 
not. Our system is designed for confrontation. That is what 
“[a]mbition . . . counteract[ing] ambition” is all about. If 
majorities in both Houses of Congress care enough about 
                                                
 84 See Samuel C. Patterson and Gregory A. Caldeira, Standing Up for Congress: 
Variations in Public Esteem since the 1960s, 15 Legis Stud Q 25, 26 (1990) (asserting 
that public esteem for Congress generally declined from the 1960s through the 1980s). 
 85 See Riley Brands, Congress’ Job Approval 19% at Start of New Session (Gallup, 
Jan 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/G9PQ-2HKW (“The 115th U.S. Congress 
begins its term with a 19% job approval rating, similar to the level measured for the 
institution in recent years and in line with the 18% to 20% ratings it received in the final 
months of 2016.”); David Wright, Gallup Poll: Trump Approval Rating at New Low (CNN 
Politics, Feb 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/59C5-LR4P (noting that only 40 
percent of Americans approved of President Donald Trump’s job performance, while 55 
percent disapproved, and that this approval rating was significantly lower than that of 
other recent presidents during their first weeks in office). 
 86 See Mark D. Ramirez, The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict on Congressional 
Approval, 53 Am J Polit Sci 681, 692 (2009) (“Public esteem for Congress diminishes 
when political parties unite in Congress to represent their partisan constituencies.”). 
 87 See Laurel Harbridge and Neil Malhotra, Electoral Incentives and Partisan 
Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments, 55 Am J Polit Sci 494, 495 
(2011) (arguing that “although the public as a whole may express a desire for greater 
bipartisanship in Congress as an institution, not all groups wish to see individual 
members compromising. . . . [S]trong partisans in the electorate . . . incentivize members 
to engage in partisan conflict”). 
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the matter, they have available innumerable ways to compel 
executive action without a lawsuit.88 
Federal lawmakers may “confront” the executive by, for 
example, investigating possible executive wrongdoing, 
threatening to withhold appropriations, and (at the extreme) 
impeachment.89 Likewise, state legislators have significant 
political clout in their own states (to complain about, for 
example, a transfer of power to an independent commission). 
Federal and state officials can also engage in media campaigns 
to win public support for their positions. As Scalia suggested, by 
denying standing to government institutions, federal courts make 
room for this political process to work itself out (warts and all). By 
contrast, “[p]lacing the Constitution’s entirely anticipated 
political arm wrestling into permanent judicial receivership does 
not do the system a favor.”90 
C. A Cautionary Note on Government Standing 
My past work has argued that the structural Constitution 
significantly limits the power of the federal executive, the 
federal legislature, and the states to invoke federal 
jurisdiction.91 Although the Constitution does give the federal 
and state governments “special” standing to enforce and defend 
their own laws, government standing does not (in my view) 
extend much beyond those contexts. But, for now, I put to one 
side the structural case against broad government standing. 
This Essay raises more prudential concerns about the recent 
increase in, and acceptance of, intergovernmental disputes. 
Notably, many scholars have welcomed these disputes—and 
the corresponding expansion of government standing.92 It is easy 
                                                
 88  Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2704 (Scalia dissenting), quoting Federalist 51 (Madison), 
in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed). 
 89 For an illuminating discussion of Congress’s power to investigate the 
executive, see generally Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U 
Chi L Rev 1083 (2009). 
 90 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2705 (Scalia dissenting). 
 91 See note 17. My earlier articles did not, however, address one important issue: 
whether federal and state government entities have standing to assert “institutional 
injuries.” I take on that issue in separate work. See generally Tara Leigh Grove, Can 
Institutions Be Injured? (unpublished manuscript, 2017) (on file with author). 
 92 To be sure, scholars endorse government standing for somewhat different 
reasons and with different degrees of enthusiasm.  Nevertheless, the general trend 
among scholars is to favor broad government standing.   For scholarship supporting 
state standing, see, for example, Calvin Massey, State Standing after Massachusetts v 
EPA, 61 Fla L Rev 249, 276 (2009) (arguing that states can “ensure that executive 
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to see the allure. In an era of partisan gridlock, with public faith 
in the political process at an all-time low, it seems wise to rely 
on the one institution of government that seems to be 
functioning reasonably well: the judiciary.93 
But this preference for litigation seems to rest on an 
assumption that the judiciary will remain unchanged, even as a 
fundamentally new crop of lawsuits comes its way. There are 
good reasons to question this premise. To the extent that courts 
become embroiled in more and more political controversies, that 
may have a significant impact on the functioning of the judiciary 
itself. 
Intergovernmental litigation differs from private-party 
actions in important ways. For starters, government-initiated 
lawsuits seem likely to pull the judiciary into disputes at a much 
earlier stage. This point is most clearly illustrated by claims of 
“institutional injury.” Under the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Arizona State Legislature, a state institution is injured and can 
bring suit as soon as the state constitution transfers one of its 
powers to another entity.94 Likewise, the district court in 
Burwell found that a chamber of Congress suffered injury and 
could sue the executive branch as soon as it (allegedly) misspent 
federal funds.95 As Scalia suggested, under this reasoning, a 
government institution “can pop immediately into court, in [its] 
institutional capacity,” to complain about another entity’s 
interference with its powers.96 Either chamber of Congress may, 
for example, sue “whenever the President refuses to implement 
                                                                                                             
discretion is confined within the boundaries of the Constitution and federal law”). For 
discussions of legislative standing, see Matthew I. Hall, Making Sense of Legislative 
Standing, 90 S Cal L Rev 1, 27–28 (2016) (advocating legislative standing to vindicate 
an “institutional injury”); Bradford C. Mank, Does a House of Congress Have Standing 
over Appropriations? The House of Representatives Challenges the Affordable Care Act, 
19 U Pa J Const L 141, 144 (2016) (arguing “in favor of institutional congressional 
standing . . . to defend core constitutional authority possessed by Congress” but not to 
challenge “how the executive branch implements a particular federal statute”); 
Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Constitutional Standing, 114 Mich L Rev 
339, 343–44 (2015) (advocating congressional standing to sue the executive branch in a 
variety of settings). 
 93 Notably, public confidence in the federal judiciary is strong as compared to other 
federal institutions. See Joseph Daniel Ura and Patrick C. Wohlfarth, “An Appeal to the 
People”: Public Opinion and Congressional Support for the Supreme Court, 72 J Polit 
939, 945–46 (2010) (“[O]ver the last three decades, confidence in the Supreme Court has 
been consistently higher than confidence in Congress and [ ] this difference has generally 
increased over time.”). 
 94 See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2659. 
 95 See Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d at 69–77. 
 96 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2703–04 (Scalia dissenting). 
GROVE_ESS_FLIP (BHC) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/11/2017  10:09 AM 
2017] Justice Scalia’s Other Standing Legacy 2261 
 
a statute he believes to be unconstitutional, [or] whenever he 
implements a law in a manner that is not to Congress’s liking”; 
the president may, in turn, “sue Congress for its erroneous 
adoption of an unconstitutional law” that undermines executive 
power “or perhaps for its protracted failure to act on one of his 
nominations.”97 
Some commentators may favor a system in which 
constitutional disputes are resolved more quickly by the 
judiciary. In an important essay, Professor Jamal Greene 
argues that the Supreme Court should at times “grant 
institutional standing to public organs” and “engage in abstract 
review” of structural constitutional questions.98 Greene points in 
particular to National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning,99 
which involved the scope of the president’s recess appointments 
power.100 That issue of presidential power had been a subject of 
debate between Congress and the president for two centuries.101 
Yet the Supreme Court did not take up the issue until 2014, 
after a private party with a concrete injury brought suit.102 
Greene asserts that, in many cases, such “delays are not the 
happy by-product of political constitutionalism; they are serious 
                                                
 97 Id at 2704 (Scalia dissenting). This Essay does not mean to suggest that courts 
have upheld these specific institutional standing claims. In Burwell, the district court 
found that the House of Representatives lacked standing simply to challenge the 
executive’s implementation of federal law. See Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d at 57–58. But 
Scalia’s examples do underscore that governments might get into court much more 
quickly, if they were permitted to assert claims of “institutional injury.” 
 98 Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 Harv L Rev 
124, 128 (2014) (“[W]here constitutional disputes concern a rule that specifies the 
division of powers between governmental institutions, the Court should be permitted to 
engage in abstract review, to grant institutional standing to public organs, and to bind 
nonparties to the case.”). The goal here is not to directly take on Greene’s thoughtful 
argument for institutional standing, nor to suggest that he would advocate standing in 
all the cases discussed in this Essay. (Greene states that his proposal would not allow 
government standing in suits over the president’s removal power or over the scope of the 
executive’s implementation of federal law. See id at 149–50 & n 155.) Instead, this Essay 
mentions Green’s analysis because others may share the view that delays in adjudication 
can be harmful. This Essay suggests that such delays can also greatly benefit the federal 
courts. 
 99 134 S Ct 2550 (2014). 
 100 Id at 2556. 
 101 See id at 2561–73 (discussing in detail the historical practice concerning, and 
debates over, the president’s recess appointments power). 
 102 See id at 2557 (noting that Noel Canning challenged the makeup of the NLRB as 
a violation of the Recess Appointments Clause after the Board ruled against the 
company in a collective bargaining dispute). 
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side effects of the Court’s own traditional decisional 
procedures.”103 
Delays in judicial decision-making may indeed create 
challenges. But such delays can also protect the federal judiciary 
from becoming (too quickly) enmeshed in divisive political 
battles. A longstanding debate over the president’s removal 
power illustrates this point. In the 1860s, the Republican 
majority in Congress was at loggerheads with Democratic 
President Andrew Johnson over the reconstruction efforts in the 
South.104 The conflict intensified when Johnson fired Secretary of 
War Edwin Stanton, in direct defiance of the Tenure of Office 
Act.105 (The Act permitted the president to remove such an 
executive officer only with the approval of the Senate.)106 This 
dispute raised an important constitutional question: whether 
Congress could limit the president’s power to remove high-ranking 
executive officials. But none of the institutional players thought to 
ask for a judicial resolution of this question. Instead, the House of 
Representatives impeached Johnson, and the political branches 
debated the constitutional issue in those impeachment 
proceedings.107 The Supreme Court did not rule on the 
president’s removal authority until 1926—when a private party 
with a concrete injury brought suit.108 
For the judiciary, this delay in adjudication was likely a 
very good thing. In the 1860s, congressional Republicans had a 
contentious relationship with not only Johnson but also the 
federal judiciary. That Congress assumed it could remove 
Article III judges outside the impeachment process, supported 
defiance of federal-court orders, and eliminated the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a pending case.109 Had the 
                                                
 103 Greene, 128 Harv L Rev at 127 (cited in note 98). 
 104 See Saikrishna Prakash, The Story of Myers and Its Wayward Successors: Going 
Postal on the Removal Power, in Christopher H. Schroeder and Curtis A. Bradley, eds, 
Presidential Power Stories 165, 168 (Foundation 2009). 
 105 14 Stat 430 (1867). 
 106 See Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 250–59 (1926) (Brandeis dissenting) 
(explaining the history of the Tenure of Office Act).  
 107 See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and 
Constitutional Meaning 121–32 (Harvard 1999). 
 108  Myers, 272 US at 176 (striking down the restriction on the president’s removal 
authority). Congress had repealed the Tenure of Office Act twenty years after the 1860s 
impeachment battle. Id at 168. Myers involved a narrower (and far less contentious) 
1876 statute, which provided that the president could remove postmasters only “by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Id at 106–08. 
 109 These episodes are detailed in separate work. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins 
(and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 Vand L Rev *1 (forthcoming 2018) (arguing 
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judiciary been asked to step into the fray over the president’s 
removal authority, that could have fueled additional attacks. 
Standing restrictions not only delay litigation but also 
prevent some issues from reaching the courts at all. Indeed, 
there are good reasons to presume that no private party would 
have standing to raise the issues at the heart of several recent 
intergovernmental disputes. The Supreme Court strongly 
suggested as much in Massachusetts, when it declared that 
states are “entitled to special solicitude in [the] standing 
analysis” when they challenge federal agency action (or 
inaction).110 Likewise, in Burwell, the district court 
acknowledged that no private party could have brought suit over 
the federal executive’s alleged misuse of appropriated funds.111 
The examples need not stop there. As Scalia suggested in 
Windsor, expanded government standing could allow additional 
(and heretofore unimaginable) issues to reach the courts. For 
example, the president could sue Congress not only “for its 
erroneous adoption of an unconstitutional law” but perhaps even 
“for its protracted failure to act on one of his nominations.”112 In 
other words, in a new world of government standing, Obama 
might have brought suit against the Senate for failing to act on 
his nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to fill Justice Scalia’s 
                                                                                                             
that, over time, political actors have rejected certain methods of attacking the federal 
judiciary and built “conventions of judicial independence”). 
 110 Massachusetts, 549 US at 518, 520 (“It is of considerable relevance that the party 
seeking review here is a sovereign State and not . . . a private individual.”). The Court 
found that Massachusetts was injured—and could bring suit to challenge the EPA’s 
failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions—because the state was losing coastline. See 
id at 520–26 (concluding that the gradual loss of the state’s coastline was a 
“particularized injury” that was traceable to the EPA’s failure to regulate, and 
suggesting that regulation by the EPA could “slow or reduce” global warming as well as 
the risk to Massachusetts’ coastline) (emphasis omitted). That injury—the loss of 
coastline—at first glance appears to be a concrete injury that a private party could 
assert. But both the Court’s opinion, which repeatedly emphasized the state’s “special” 
status, and the oral argument in the case, indicate that a Court majority would not have 
granted similar standing to a private party. Most notably, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
suggested during oral argument that Massachusetts might have “some special standing 
as a State” that would differentiate it from a “big [private] landowner that owned lots of 
coastline.” See Transcript of Oral Argument, Massachusetts v Environmental Protection 
Agency, Docket No 05-1120, *14–15 (US Nov 29, 2006). 
 111 See Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d at 72–73 (“[B]ecause the House occupies a unique 
role in the appropriations process prescribed by the Constitution, not held by the 
ordinary citizen, perversion of that process inflicts on the House a particular injury quite 
distinguishable from any suffered by the public generally.”). 
 112 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2704. 
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seat on the Supreme Court.113 Perhaps such a lawsuit still seems 
far-fetched. But a few years ago, it might have seemed far-
fetched that the House of Representatives would take the 
executive branch to court, in part for delaying enforcement of a 
federal statute that many members of the House sought to 
repeal. Yet the House brought that suit in Burwell. 
There is no way, of course, to predict with certainty what 
kinds of intergovernmental disputes may arise in the future—or 
what effect those disputes will have on the judiciary—if the 
courts continue to be receptive to government standing claims. 
But we should not forget that one of the central purposes of 
standing doctrine is to safeguard the federal judiciary against 
such risks—by ensuring that the courts do not become 
substitute forums for matters that should be left to the political 
process.114 That is, standing restrictions help secure “the 
judiciary’s credibility and reputation” by ensuring that it does 
not become embroiled “in every important political or 
constitutional controversy.”115 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia had good reason to be skeptical of government 
standing. But contrary to the Justice’s assertions, that is not 
because grants of standing represent a “power grab” by the 
judiciary. Instead, the rise in government-initiated litigation 
seems to be a symptom of deeper issues in our constitutional 
separation of powers. Elected officials are all too eager to refer 
controversial issues to the courts; judges, in turn, may be willing 
to take these cases, because they (like the public generally) have 
lost confidence in the democratic process. Federal courts cannot 
reverse these trends simply by placing restrictions on 
government standing. But such restrictions would, at least, curb 
                                                
 113 See Jon Schuppe, Merrick Garland Now Holds the Record for Longest Supreme 
Court Wait (NBC News, July 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ZP9G-56SZ. 
 114 See Valley Forge Christian College v Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, 454 US 464, 473 (1982) (“Were the federal courts merely publicly funded 
forums for the ventilation of public grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential 
understanding, the concept of ‘standing’ would be quite unnecessary.”); John A. Ferejohn 
and Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing 
Judicial Restraint, 77 NYU L Rev 962, 1003–07 (2002) (emphasizing how justiciability 
tests, including the prohibition on advisory opinions, help protect “the judiciary’s 
credibility and reputation” by limiting its role in political and constitutional 
controversies). 
 115 Ferejohn and Kramer, 77 NYU L Rev at 1007 (cited in note 114). 
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one manifestation—and thereby help to prevent an 
“overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance.”116 
 
                                                
 116 Scalia, 17 Suffolk U L Rev at 881 (cited in note 14). 
